How do US state firearms laws affect firearms manufacturing location? An empirical investigation, 1986-2010 by Brauer, Jürgen et al.
Page 0 
 
HOW DO U.S. STATE FIREARMS LAWS AFFECT FIREARMS MANUFACTURING 
LOCATION? AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION, 1986-2010 
Jurgen Brauer*, Daniel Montolio**, and Elisa Trujillo-Baute*** 
ABSTRACT 
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HOW DO U.S. STATE FIREARMS LAWS AFFECT FIREARMS MANUFACTURING 
LOCATION? AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION, 1986-2010 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An extensive scholarly literature addresses demand-side aspects of the firearms market, both for 
the United States and elsewhere, and especially so in regard to illicit firearms trade and to self-
directed, accidental, or criminal firearms misuse.1 In contrast, there is little literature on – and 
hence little understanding of – the supply side of the market to address questions such as these: 
Who are the suppliers and how many are there? How much do they produce and at what cost? 
What is the product range and how much do manufacturers charge for their products? What is 
the industrial organization of the industry? How do federal and state (or national and provincial) 
laws and regulations influence firms’ behavior and collective market outcomes?2 
This paper studies how variations in U.S. state firearms laws affect the number of firearms 
manufacturing plants (or “establishments”) across states. It thus opens up a supply-side avenue 
for the empirical investigation of de facto firearms policy as enshrined in state laws. In addition, 
and unlike a number of recent studies, ours is based on much more extensive – and unique – 
panel data, covering the time period 1986 to 2010. 3 Statistically controlling for factors such as 
                                                          
1 Of the ample literature see, e.g., Cook and Ludwig (2000); Hemenway (2004); Cook and Goss (2014); Briggs and 
Tabarrok (2014); Taylor and Li (2015). 
2 From the 1960s and into the early 1980s, economic historians debated the role of firearms manufacturing within 
the American System of Manufacture, that is, the role of firearms production during the advent of mechanization 
and mass production with interchangeable parts in the 1800s. Industries that worked with metals and revolving parts 
such as agricultural implements (e.g., reapers), sewing machines, clock making, bicycles, locomotives, and firearms 
played a prominent role as precursors to the rise of industrialization (see, e.g., Habakkuk, 1962; Rosenberg, 1963; 
Howard, 1979; Smith Merritt, 1973; Hounshell, 1984). For more recent, industrial organization type of work, see 
Hall, et al. (2008) and, especially, Brauer (2013). 
3 Firearms policy: Other research examines aspects such as health and public safety of relatively lax or strict state 
firearms laws, e.g., Webster, Crifasi, and Vernick (2014). Recent studies: See, e.g., Fleegler, et al. (2013); Kahane 
(2013); Knight (2013); Lanza (2013); Depetris-Chauvin (2015). 
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the size of state populations, labor force unionization rates, industrial wage rates, tax burdens, 
and the share of manufacturing in state economies, we test the hypothesis that U.S. states with 
firearms laws deemed favorable to firearms end-users host a larger number of firearms 
establishments than do those with less favorable laws. While this hypothesis may seem 
straightforward, it does not appear to have been tested statistically, separating out the effect of 
state firearms laws from other factors that might affect the number of firearms establishments for 
any given state and year. Our findings suggest that states with relatively lax firearms laws do 
host disproportionately large numbers of firearms establishments. However, we also find that the 
number of plants in a particular state and year is affected by a variety of factors, of which 
relevant law is but one. “Permissive” or “restrictive” law alone does not suffice to determine the 
number of firearms manufacturing establishments.4  
The paper is motivated, in part, by a spate of announcements firearms manufacturers made 
in 2013 and 2014 to move their production lines out of the U.S. state of Connecticut, following a 
mass shooting there in December 2012 and which led to a discussion of whether to “strengthen” 
that state’s firearms laws.5 Similar pronouncements – “If the law is tightened, we move” – have 
been made by manufacturing members of the industry in the wake of other mass shootings, prior 
to 2012. This paper assesses the implied threat, i.e., the relation between state firearms laws and 
firearms manufacturing location, with the data at hand (1986-2010) when we commenced the 
research. Since state firearms laws, in Connecticut as elsewhere, do not primarily regulate 
                                                          
4 We do not estimate a tipping point beyond which “restrictive” law becomes “permissive” as the state firearms laws 
data we have assembled are not sufficiently unambiguous and fine-grained to justify such an effort. Note that state-
level data are too coarse to show meaningful clustering and hence preclude us from using spatial techniques that 
could be appropriate if one focused on county-level data as, for instance, McDougal, et al. (2014). 
5 The shooting occurred at an elementary school in Newtown, CT, and sparked a nationwide debate on federal and 
state firearms laws. For an overview of law changes that were proposed, see Krouse (2013). For journalistic 
accounts of mooted or actual state-to-state moves by firearms manufacturers, see Ghosh (2014) and Shooting 
Industry, the industry’s main trade publication (January 2015, p. 47). 
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firearms production but end-user access to and use of firearms,6 and since the firearms market is 
thoroughly national – there are federal but no state-level restrictions on firearms shipments from 
manufacturers to wholesale or retail outlets anywhere in the country – the main criterion for 
firearms manufacturing location should be idiosyncratic location preferences and economic cost, 
not state firearms laws directed at end-users. Thus, after accounting for cost, the threat to move, 
or any actual move, of firearms manufacturing from one state to another must have a behavioral 
component to it, reflecting a firm’s preference to be located in one state rather than another. For 
example, given the long-standing political and cultural controversy in the country surrounding 
the ownership and use of firearms, manufacturers and their employees might feel more welcome 
in firearms-“friendly” states and or they might consider a state-to-state move as a form of protest, 
even as this may be costly from a business perspective. Since we include cost-relevant and other 
control variables in our empirical work, we can isolate their effect from the law-variables to 
capture this behavioral aspect.7 
Regarding causality, state firearms laws are not passed randomly at random times. The 
relevant laws that are in force in any given year instead might be viewed as endogenous to 
previously evolved population preferences in regard to firearms access and end-use. Importantly, 
                                                          
6 We will return to this point but already it may be indicated that it is extremely important to appreciate that there are 
no production-focused state firearms laws per se. State firearms laws are aimed at firearms access and end-use. In 
the case of Connecticut, for example, new restrictive state laws introduced in 2013 expressly do not restrict 
manufacturing, only end-use. Thus, even though use-limitations were imposed on so-called assault weapons, for 
example, the law also states that “[a]ny person, firm, or corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing 
assault weapons in Connecticut may manufacture or transport them for sale in state to exempt parties or out of 
state” (CGS § 53-202i, as amended by PA 13-3; our emphasis). Quoted from the Office of Legislative Research, 
Connecticut General Assembly, 29 May 2013, 2013-R-0241, “Weapons Banned as Assault Weapons” Appendix II 
(http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/2013-R-0241.htm) [accessed 19 January 2015]. 
7 As we explain later, the raw data on manufacturers cannot reliably identify firms newly established in any one state 
or year. In our empirical work, we track the annual stock of manufacturing establishments present in a state so that if 
company X did move all or part of its manufacturing operations from state Y in year t to state Z in year t+1, this 
movement will be captured in our establishment stock data.  
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however, neither the content nor the timing of changes in state firearms laws is straightforward. 
Changing state firearms laws is an intensely contested activity, can take considerable time to 
implement, can enable and disable different aspects of the law at the same time, and often results 
in fairly minor net adjustments to the law (as was the case for the Connecticut shooting). In that 
sense, law is not all that reactive to or contemporaneous with on-the-ground events. Moreover, as 
already indicated in note 6, and as shown in more detail in Section II, state firearms laws 
overwhelmingly are consumer-oriented laws, not producer-oriented laws, and thus exogenous to 
establishment decisions, reflecting the overall firearms-related state “business climate” for 
firearms manufacturers.8 Section II discusses our unique datasets and presents the expected 
results for our main variables of interest. Section III discusses our estimation strategy and 
presents the actual estimations and results. Section IV discusses, interprets, and contextualizes 
the findings.  
 
II. DATA 
Apart from control variables, four main datasets are of relevance. To understand their 
possibilities and limitations, each needs careful description. We label the four datasets as (1) 
ATF/AFMER; (2) ATF/Laws; (3) B/L; and (4) V/H. The first of these concerns firearms 
production and location data; the other three concern data regarding state firearms laws.9 
1. Firearms Manufacturers (ATF/AFMER) 
The first dataset is compiled from print copies of the Annual Firearms Manufacturing and Export 
Report (AFMER), a publication of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 
                                                          
8 In Appendix B we show empirically that while state firearms laws do affect firearms demand, the laws’ effect on 
demand does not spill over to the manufacturing establishment aspect of the supply-side of the market. 
9 In Appendix B, we describe a fifth dataset, the FBI’s monthly National Instant Background Check System (NICS). 
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(ATF). Under federal law, in the United States every manufacturer and importer of, and dealer 
in, firearms or other destructive devices must obtain a federal firearms license (FFL). This 
license is issued for the actual premise (or “establishment”) of firearm manufacture or sale. For 
example, for Kahr Arms – a prominent pistol maker – the FFL is issued not for its corporate 
headquarters in New York state, but for its manufacturing sites in Massachusetts (in the town of 
Worcester, MA, under the licensee name Saeilo, Inc., which is Kahr’s parent company) and in 
Minnesota (in the towns of Fridley, Minneapolis, and Pillager, under licensee Magnum Research, 
a division of Kahr Arms). Also by federal law, each U.S.-based manufacturer is required 
annually to report to the ATF the number of firearms released into commerce (direct sales, 
wholesale, or retail for domestic release or for export, but excluding military sales).10 
Intermediary manufactures who sell to other manufacturers to finish or assemble firearms do not 
report to AFMER and therefore do not form part of our dataset. Further, licenses are valid for 
three years, but not every FFL manufacturer necessarily sells firearms in every year. Thus, the 
total number of FFLs is substantially different from the total number of FFLs required to report 
to AFMER. 
At the time of the data collection, records were available for 1998 to 2012 in PDF format on 
the ATF’s website.11 Because of limitations on other data, the research reported here extends 
through the year 2010 only. In addition, through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request 
we obtained additional annual AFMER records reaching back to 1986 so that our manufacturing 
                                                          
10 “Released into commerce” does not necessarily equal “production” as production into inventory is not counted. In 
contrast, sales from inventory are counted. For example, if in 2009 manufacturer ABC produced 1,000 firearms, sold 
900, and put the remaining 100 into inventory, it would report to the ATF 900 firearms “released into commerce.” If 
ABC in 2010 then produced 1,500 firearms, but sold 1,600 (1,500 produced plus 100 from the prior year’s 
inventory), ABC would report to the ATF unit sales of 1,600 for the year 2010.  
11 As of 2014, the ATF has made some datasets available in an electronic format. See https://www.atf.gov/resource-
center/data-statistics (last accessed 5 February 2016). 
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database includes all reporting firearms establishments for the calendar years 1986 to 2010. For 
each premise, we know the street address and the number of firearms produced for each type of 
firearm (pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, and miscellaneous firearms). 
Certain problems arise in statistical work when using the AFT/AFMER data. As mentioned, 
the federal firearms license is issued for each premise. Thus, our database includes information 
on federal firearms licensees at 3,151 physical addresses. However, when a licensee changes its 
legal name during a given calendar year, say from Arms Mfg, Inc. to Arms Mfg, LLC, 
technically a new FFL is required. The same address is entered twice for that year, leading to 
double counting of establishments. Likewise, when Remington Arms and therefore its Ilion, NY, 
plant changed ownership, a new FFL was required for the new owners to operate the plant, even 
as the premise did not change. For the year in which ownership changed, there are then two 
entries in that year’s AFMER, one under the old ownership and one under the new ownership. 
For well-known firearms manufacturers one can make corrections in the dataset if one is familiar 
with ownership changes. But for the vast majority of FFLs, ownership information is not 
available and judgments have to be made of whether or not to treat a specific street address as a 
genuinely new firearms establishment or as a continuing operation under a different licensee 
name. 
In another example, a firm going by the licensee name Entreprise Arms Inc. (the unusual 
spelling is correct) has had three FFLs issued for three physical addresses, all in Irwindale, 
California, and all within a distance of 1.7 miles of each other. This appears to be a firm under 
continuous ownership, just changing to a different premise within the same part of town. What 
are three entries in the ATF/AFMER database should, for our purposes, be one. Similarly, from 
time to time FFLs need to be renewed. Some manufacturers let their license lapse, however. 
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When reissued, it is issued with a new FFL number and entered in the AFT/AFMER record as a 
new premise even if the physical address is identical to one used in some prior year. Another 
quirk is that a firm may produce reportable firearms in one year, then not produce firearms for 
several years (but continue other metal-works fabrications, or produce only as a contract 
manufacturer), and then produce reportable firearms again, in effect acting like a peak-load 
producer when demand is high for instance. In a word, it is difficult to reliably identify genuinely 
new firearms establishments in the AFMER data. Our work therefore uses the annual stock of 
reporting firms as its dependent variable. 
The issue of establishment double-counting can be dealt with, if somewhat imperfectly. 
Given our industry knowledge, we made adjustments where we could and ultimately retained 
5,953 data points, corresponding to a total of 2,721 unique firearms manufacturing plants across 
the 25-year span of our data. Table 1 shows the record by state for selected years. For 1986, for 
instance, California shows 22 firearms plants. In 2010, there were 27. The state-by-state 
composition of firearms manufacturing premises definitely has changed over the years, and the 
research question simply asks how, apart from cost and other control variables, state firearms 
laws may have affected this changing composition. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
2. Regulatory variables 
2.1. ATF/Laws 
The other three main datasets are codings of state firearms laws. The first of these comes from 
the ATF as well, and we refer to this dataset as ATF/Laws. From time to time, the Bureau issues 
a publication called ATF State Laws and Published Ordinances–Firearms (ATF Publication 
5300.5). The 31st edition, for example, refers to 2010-2011 and consists of over 500 densely 
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printed pages. The currency of the state laws and publications, however, varies. For Alabama, for 
example, the publication is current through the “End of [the] 2010 First Special Session,” for 
California through to the end of the “2009 Regular and Extraordinary Session,” for Indiana, 
through the end of the “2010 Second Regular Session,” and so on. A check with the relevant 
personnel revealed that the ATF itself does not keep a full set of copies of past editions of 
Publication 5300.5. From various libraries we obtained full or partial copies of Publication 
5300.5 for the publication years 1998 (21st ed.), 2000 (22nd ed.), 2001 (23rd ed.), 2003 (24th 
ed.), 2004 (25th ed.), 2005 (26th ed.), 2006 (27th ed.), 2007 (28th ed.), 2008 (29th ed.), 2009-
2010 (30th ed.), and 2010-2011 (31st ed.). While the publications are continuous—the twenty-
first to the thirty-first editions—there are data gaps for 1998 and 2001 (no corresponding 1999 
and 2002 editions were published for those data years). For the case of the 2001 data, the data 
was indirectly obtained and reconstructed for all states, given the consistency of the values of the 
relevant regulatory variables for 2000 and 2002. A similar procedure was applied to the 1998 
data gap; however, in the latter case not all the information was recovered. Therefore, for the 
year 1998 some observations are missing. Consequently, we decided to perform two sets of 
estimations, one for the whole sample period (1997-2010) with some missing values, and another 
for a restricted sample (2000-2010) with all the information for the ATF/Laws regulatory 
variables. 
Moreover, the ATF publishes only a selection of state laws and municipal ordinances and, as 
mentioned, in a number of cases we were able to locate only partial copies of the entire 
publication. In each case, however, we do have what the ATF refers to as the Ready Reference 
Table, a state-by-state summary of laws in regard to four specific themes: (1) Does the state 
impose a waiting period for prospective firearms purchasers (and, if so, for how long)? (2) Does 
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the state require firearms manufacturers and/or dealers residing in their state to carry a state 
license in addition to the required federal license? (3) Does the state preempt subordinate 
municipalities within the state from issuing their own firearms ordinances? And (4) does the state 
impose limits on the interstate purchase and sale of firearms with immediately neighboring 
(contiguous) states? 
For example, in the 2006 edition of ATF/Laws, the state of Connecticut is listed as having a 
2-week-long waiting period for long guns (but not handguns); requires manufacturers and dealers 
of handguns (but not of long guns) to carry a state license in addition to the federal license; has 
no state laws in regard to preemption of municipal ordinances; and likewise has no provisions in 
regard to interstate commerce. As shown in Table 2, Panel A, we implement coding of these four 
state law variables in two ways: First, as zero-one binary variables indicating the absence or 
presence of a state law regarding a firearms purchase waiting period (ATF_waitperiod_1), 
preemption of local (i.e., municipal) regulation by state law (ATF_preemption), and whether 
there are state law restrictions on end-user commerce with immediately neighboring states 
(ATF_interstate) and, second, as count variables where we count the number of provisions in 
state law with respect to the variables purchase waiting period (ATF_waitperiod_2) and state 
licensing requirements for dealers or manufacturers (ATF_statelicense). For example, for 
purchase waiting period, we code either 0 or 1 or the number of hours (14 days, i.e., 336 hours, 
for Connecticut, for instance) and we code the number of state laws dealing with licensing (for 
the year 2005, two for Maryland, for instance, namely Public Safety Act Art. 5-106 and Art. 11-
105). (Note that Appendix Table A1 contains a more detailed version of Table 2.) 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
We expected that either version of the ATF_waitperiod variable might carry a negative sign 
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but also that it never should come in with a statistically significant coefficient, as indeed it never 
did. This variable measures whether in any given year a state imposed a waiting period on end-
purchasers and, if so, for how many days (but measured in hours). One would not expect, 
however, that this should affect the presence of firearms manufacturing in a state. Firearms are 
sold in a national, indeed global, market and a waiting period requirement in any one state should 
not affect the number of firearms manufacturing establishments there. Likewise, whether state 
law preempts or permits ordinances at the substate level in regard to firearms end-use should not 
affect the number of manufacturing premises in the state. There may be a positive sign on the 
parameter (preempting additional municipal regulation being favorable to the industry) but in 
only one of our regressions did this variable turn up with a (weak) statistically significant 
coefficient. The findings are shown in Tables 4 and 5 in Section III. 
Similarly, one would not expect that whether or not a state restricts firearms commerce with 
its immediate neighboring states would affect the establishment of a manufacturing site. At first 
sight, one might believe that a manufacturer of hunting rifles in Montana, say, might be 
discouraged by an interstate commerce restriction but the relevant (federal and) state laws do not 
prohibit the manufacturer from shipping hunting rifles to a neighboring state for sale through 
dealers there. To illustrate the point: In 2005, the relevant provision in Montana state law reads: 
“Residents of Montana may purchase any rifle or rifles and shotgun or shotguns in a state 
contiguous to Montana,” and similarly for residents of contiguous states wishing to purchase in 
Montana (Art. 45-8-341 & 45-8-342). The important point here is, again, that the interstate 
restriction (or permission) pertains to the end-user (demander), not to the manufacturer 
(supplier). In our regressions, we neither expected nor found a statistically significant sign, in 
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either direction, for this variable.12 However, for the state licensing variable (ATF_statelicense), 
we did expect a statistically significant negative sign: The presence of a state license requirement 
in addition to the federal license requirement would be associated with a smaller number of 
firearms premises hosted in the state and for the years in which the law was in effect. In all the 
regressions we ran (with the full set of controls), this turned out to be the case.13 Even as state 
licensing requirements do not seem particularly onerous, and most often concern dealers rather 
than manufacturers, they reflect state sentiment directed at the supply side rather than the 
demand side of the market. 
2.2. B/L data 
Another dataset that codes state firearms laws comes from the combined effort of the Brady 
Campaign to Prevent Violence (in Washington, D.C.) and the Law Center to Prevent Gun 
Violence (in San Francisco, CA).14 We refer to this as the B/L data. As for the ATF/Laws data, 
the B/L data origin and coding are not ideal for research purposes. Both organizations are “anti-
gun,” which may be presumed to color their selection and reading of state law, and at the time 
we collected the data neither organization kept a full set of data on its website. We obtained the 
B/L State Scorecard sheets for 2007 to 2011 – presumably covering the calendar or legislative 
years 2006 to 2010 – through internet searches and also directly from Dr. Eric Fleegler (see 
Fleegler, et al., 2013). One difficulty is that the various Scorecards are not fully comparable 
                                                          
12 In the GMM estimates (Appendix Table D1), however, this variable does generate positive coefficients at the 5% 
level of statistical significance. If one is inclined to view an interstate commerce restriction as negatively affecting 
manufacturers in immediately adjacent states, then one might in fact expect more manufacturers to locate in-state. 
13 This is also true in the case of the Poisson (Appendix C) and the GMM (Appendix D) estimates. 
14 The Brady Campaign to Prevent Violence (Washington, D.C.) produces its annual State Scorecard in conjunction 
with the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence (San Francisco, CA). Reports were published in 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, and 2011 but appear to refer to the years 2006 to 2010, respectively. In addition, Mayors Against Illegal Guns 
(MAIG, 2010) produced a one-time effort to code state firearms laws. As of this writing, the Brady Campaign is at 
www.bradycampaign.org and the Law Center at www.smartgunlaws.org [both last accessed on 5 February 2016]. 
Page 12 
 
across years. Thus, the B/L data show the same five rubrics for all the years (Curb Firearm 
Trafficking; Strengthen Brady Background Checks; Child Safety; Guns in Public Places and 
Local Control; and Ban Assault Weapons) but the rubrics are not divided into headings and 
subheadings in a consistent way throughout the data span. For example, in the 2007 State 
Scorecard, the Strengthen Brady Background Checks rubric consists of three categories with a 
total of 12 subheadings. In 2011, the same rubric consists also of three categories and 12 
subheadings – but different ones! 
Therefore, like Fleegler, et al. (2013), we felt that the B/L data were not usable in their 
original form, and we reconstructed the rubrics to obtain consistent measures for the relevant 
time period (see Table 2, Panel B, and Appendix Table A1). Our B/L_trafficking variable is an 
aggregate in regard to various measures that pertain to the curbing of firearms trafficking; 
B/L_checks is an aggregate dealing with the strengthening of background checks; B/L_childsafe 
is an aggregate capturing child safety provisions; and B/L_publicplace is a measure of 
regulations regarding firearms use in public places and the degree of municipal control. In 
creating these index variables, we kept the original B/L scores but reweighted them. 
For our version of the B/L data, we expect the B/L_trafficking and B/L_checks variables to 
be negatively related to the number of manufacturing plants hosted by a state in the belief that 
both are proxies for the general regulatory environment manufactures face when setting up a 
manufacturing establishment in a specific state. The first of these might even be statistically 
significant if anti-trafficking state law were thought to “hold off” some potentially unscrupulous 
manufacturers; the second should not be expected to result in a statistically significant coefficient 
as state background checks may not add much in practice to federal background checks and 
clearly are directed at end-users, not manufacturers. Our findings confirm our expectations 
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(Tables 6 and 7 in Section III). Our findings also hold in the Poisson and GMM estimates.  
A child access prevention (CAP) requirement, B/L_childsafe, could conceivably affect plant 
siting, depending on what the specific state law requires. If the law requires the use of an after-
market firearms lock, for instance, this would not be expected to affect manufacturers’ site 
decision and thus should not affect the number of plants in a state. But if a law required a lock to 
be built into the weapon in the first place, this might be perceived as a regulation directed against 
manufacturers and hence affect the number of plants established. The cost would still be incurred 
in order to sell firearms in that state but manufacturers may not wish to “reward” that state with 
jobs. (This is an issue, for instance, in the ongoing debate over microstamping a weapon’s firing 
pin, which would add to manufacturing costs.) In practice, most child safety provisions make the 
end-user legally responsible for preventing firearms access by children (DeSimone, et al., 2013). 
Thus, this is a consumption-related rather than a production-related variable, and we would not 
expect it to be statistically significant in relation to the number of firearms establishments hosted 
in any given state or year. Finally, B/L_publicplace also relates to the use of firearms (the 
demand side) and, although the sign might be negative, we do not expect it to affect the number 
of firearms plants in a statistically significant way in any given state or year. For both of these 
variables this, again, is what we find in our regressions run with all control variables (see Tables 
6 and 7 in Section III). 
2.3. V/H data 
Finally, a dataset laboriously assembled by Jon S. Vernick and Lisa M. Hepburn (Vernick and 
Hepburn, 2003) codes state laws from 1970 to 1999 into five major rubrics (State Laws Banning 
Certain Firearms; Sales and Purchase Restrictions (1); Sales and Purchase Restrictions (2); 
Possession, Carrying, and Storage Laws; and Sentence Enhancement Laws for Possession or Use 
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of Firearm) with a total of 18 variables. As for the other datasets, we were unable to obtain an 
electronic copy of the dataset and thus hand-coded all variables from the published paper record. 
In the Sales and Purchase Restrictions (1) category for example, there are five variables, the first 
of which asks whether a state license is required to affect a firearms purchase. If not, we coded 
this as 0; if yes, we coded this as 1 for the year in which the requirement was in effect.15 We then 
regrouped the 18 V/H variables as follows (see Table 2, Panel C, and Appendix Table A1). A 
V/H_trafficking variable refers to the potential for firearms trafficking. It consists of two 
underlying variables, namely whether there is a state dealer license and inspection requirement, 
and/or whether there is a one-firearm-per-month purchasing limit (the state license component of 
this variable is analogous, but not equal, to a similar variable in the ATF/Laws dataset). 
V/H_check refers to background check variables in the V/H dataset (background checks for sales 
from dealers; background checks for private-party (nondealer) sales; permit for firearms 
purchase required; firearms registration required). Unlike for the B/L dataset, we expect that this 
variable might turn up with a statistically significant negative coefficient – as indeed it did – 
because the laws coded here predate the introduction of background checks at the federal level. 
V/H_childsafety refers to child safety laws (which contains only one variable); V/H_bans refers 
to bans of certain firearms (assault weapons ban; Saturday Night Specials ban); and 
V/H_sentencing refers to the punishment of crime involving firearms (mandatory minimum 
sentences). 
We expected the signs of V/H_trafficking, V/H_checks, and V/H_childsafe to be the same as 
for the corresponding B/L variables, i.e., negative, negative, and either negative or positive, 
                                                          
15 Vernick and Hepburn (2003) themselves attach extensive cautions to their coding, far too numerous to repeat or 
even summarize here, and we urge readers to read their original work to understand inherent data limitations. 
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respectively. As regards V/H_bans, we expected a negative coefficient (and maybe statistically 
significant; see the discussion in the final paragraph of this subsection.) Finally, although the 
sign might be negative, we do not expect that V/H_sentencing would adversely affect the number 
of manufacturing plants per state in a statistically significant way. On the whole, the empirical 
results for V/H conform to those of ATF/Law and B/L even if they are somewhat less clear 
statistically (see Tables 8 and 9 in Section III). 
Although coming from different sources, note the seeming resemblance for the first three 
indices of our versions of the B/L and the V/H datasets. They code for laws aimed at reducing 
firearms trafficking, improving background checks, and enhancing child safety. We therefore 
would expect some coherence across the estimates using the B/L and the V/H datasets. One 
might even argue that B/L_publicplace, a measure of regulations regarding firearms use in public 
places and the degree of municipal control, carries some resemblance to V/H_bans, which refers 
to bans of certain firearms (assault weapons ban; Saturday Night Specials ban). Hence, 
confronting the results obtained for these two sets of regulatory variables, although obtained for 
different time periods (2006-2010 and 1986-1999, respectively), could help confirm (or not) our 
hypothesis and point to some degree of consistency over a fairly long time period.16 
Manufacturers are subject to federal and state laws such as Occupational Health and Safety 
laws, of course, but to our knowledge there are no state laws that specifically target 
manufacturers for being producers of firearms. What state laws target are not production, but the 
product, its sale, and its use. Neither in our personal observations nor in any talks with firearms 
manufacturers or federal and state public officials have we encountered state laws and 
                                                          
16 Note that even though we do not compute a single aggregate index across all the B/L and V/H data, respectively, 
we did retain the variable weights assigned by the respective original scorers. 
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regulations specifically aimed at the manufacture of firearms. Judging from the news media, 
industry association reports, and individual firearms manufacturing firms, the industry itself also 
appears merely to refer to the relative degree of restrictions placed on its products, not on their 
production. In Beretta USA’s case, for example, “Gun laws adopted in Maryland last year [2013] 
ban some of the types of firearms that Beretta manufactures from being bought or sold in the 
state” (Washington Times, 29 January 2014). Maryland’s new laws neither prohibit Beretta to 
sell its products elsewhere nor does locating elsewhere permit Beretta to sell weapons that are 
restricted in Maryland. Therefore, incurring the cost of locating outside of Maryland makes no 
strictly economic sense. Maryland’s new laws may be viewed as a tax, reducing profit, and this 
fact is not reversed by locating elsewhere. However, laws intended to restrict the product and its 
distribution may collide with firearms manufacturers’ preferences, in particular with their and 
their customers’ self-perceived identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). If held with sufficient 
strength, identity may then affect the number of manufacturing premises in a state. In sum, since 
there are no production-targeted laws, one can only assemble and code consumption-targeted 
laws. Some of these the industry does not disagree with (e.g., criminalizing firearms misuse), and 
therefore one would not expect these laws to adversely affect establishment decisions; but other 
laws do speak to the core of law-abiding producers and users (e.g., “assault weapon” bans) and 
they may thus serve as proxies for how laws may affect establishment decisions. 
3. Control variables 
All regressions first were run without and then with a variety of control variables.17 These come 
                                                          
17 A broad economic literature deals with determinants of the physical location of industrial sites (for a recent 
survey, see Arauzo-Carod, et al., 2010). It generally focuses on simply observing the number of new firms or plants 
in a given space. A discrete choice model then captures factors shaping the agent’s decision and factors related to 
the set of alternative sites from which the choice is made. Although we focus on the number of existing plants in a 
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in three sets: private sector-related controls, public sector-related controls (including possible 
predispositions of state legislatures in regard to firearms-related legislation), and controls for 
measures of crime (see Table 3, which also shows descriptive data for the other datasets). The 
private sector-related controls include (1) the logarithm of the total state population 
(log_population) with data taken from the U.S. Census Bureau; (2) the number, also in 
logarithms, of total manufacturing establishments in a state (log_num_firms), measured as the 
annual average establishment count in private manufacturing industry and taken from the 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), Department of Labor Statistics, U.S. 
Department of Labor; (3) union membership (union_member), measured as the number of 
employed workers who are union members in private manufacturing industry and taken from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS), Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG); and (4) state industrial 
wage rates (wage_quotient), measured as the total wage location quotient relative to the entire 
U.S. in private manufacturing industry, taken from the QCEW. We control for these factors 
because it might be expected that (1) states with larger populations host larger numbers of 
manufacturers per se, including firearms manufacturers, (2) states with a larger manufacturing 
base host larger numbers of firearms manufacturers (and maybe compete more for qualified 
workers), (3) states with high rates of workforce unionization might host fewer firearms 
manufacturers, and (4) states with higher industrial wage rates might host fewer firearms 
manufacturers as well. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Regarding public sector-related control variables, we include total state revenue from 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
given state, rather than the number new plants, our estimates take the usual determinants of industrial location into 
account. Broadly speaking, these are economic factors (such as agglomeration economies, market structure, or labor 
force characteristics) and institutional factors (such as public sector intervention). 
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taxation per capita (taxes_pc), with the data taken from the U.S. Census Bureau. A priori, we 
expect a negative sign with respect to the number of firms operating in a state (the higher the per 
capita tax burden, the smaller the number of premises). We also include a political balance 
variable. Although few lawmakers will be elected primarily on the basis of their views regarding 
firearms, when such legislation does come up for a vote, a “pro” or “con” bias may reveal itself. 
We were unable to find U.S. Census data on annual political party representation in upper and 
lower state houses, but Wikipedia lists (and reliably sources) such data. We recorded and coded 
these as follows. If state Senate Republicans held the majority over state Senate Democrats in 
any year, the resulting >1 ratio was coded as +1 (and a <1 ratio was coded as –1). We coded 
similarly for the state House. Thus, a combined score (political_balance) of +2 (–2) indicates 
that Republicans (Democrats) had the majority of votes in both state houses in any given year. A 
combined score of zero (0) indicates that one house was dominated by one party and the other 
house by the other party. Finally, a combined score +1 (–1) indicates that one house was evenly 
split between the parties (resulting in a ratio of 1, and a coded score of 0 for that house), and that 
the other house was dominated by either Republicans (+1) or by Democrats (–1).18 In many 
instances, there is no variation across the 25 data years, amounting to a fixed effect condition. 
For example, and perhaps surprisingly, the Alabama legislature is dominated by Senate 
Democrats and House Democrats, yielding a –2 score across all data years (absorbed in this case 
in the Alabama fixed effect). We had no expectations in regard to the sign of this variable but 
                                                          
18 The data come from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_party_strength_in_Pennsylvania (last accessed 28 
November 2015). At the bottom of the Pennsylvania page are the relevant links to each of the other U.S. states. 
From time to time, members of other parties join the legislature. We coded these as “other,” but their occurrence is 
relatively rare (e.g., only in 3 out of 25 years in the Alabama Senate, and no occurrence at all in the Alabama 
House), and we therefore ignored “other” for our purposes. Unique among the states, Nebraska features a 
unicameral legislature and is therefore dropped in the estimations using the political balance variable. 
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thought that it would not turn up in a statistically significant way, as indeed it never did, because 
the seeming Republican-Democratic party split at the federal level does not necessarily play the 
same way at the state level, Alabama being a case in point. 
We also introduce controls that account for the level of crime in a given state; hence, we 
include variables measuring violent crime (violent_crimes_pc) and property crime 
(property_crimes_pc), both per capita, with the data taken from the Disaster Center 
<disastercenter.com/crime/> which provides access to crime statistics compiled by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. For both crime variables, we expect a negative sign (even firearms 
manufacturers do not like to operate in relatively insecure states), which is what we found,19 but 
in neither case would we necessarily expect a statistically significant coefficient. 
 
III. ESTIMATION METHODS AND RESULTS 
We ran regressions with the total number of firearms manufacturing plants per state per year 
(num_plants) as the dependent variable.20 We ran standard panel fixed effects regressions with 
robust standard errors and, as robustness checks, also ran Poisson count data and GMM dynamic 
panel data regressions.21 We take into account the panel structure of our data and introduce state 
                                                          
19 The finding carries over to the Poisson and GMM estimations, except for GMM with the V/H variables. 
20 We also performed regressions using the number of firearms produced at each of the plants. We found no 
statistically significant results of the regulatory variables on production levels: State laws seem to affect the decision 
to establish a premise in the first place, not the level of production once an establishment decision has been made 
and sunk costs have been incurred (these regressions are not reported here but are available upon request). 
21 As discussed by Wooldridge (2016) specifying robust standard errors is equivalent to specifying errors clustered 
at the state level, where the state is the variable that identifies the panel. The Poisson estimates (see Appendix C) are 
performed because of the nature of our dependent variable. As explained, our dependent variable is simply an 
observation about the number of plants located in, say, Florida. It could well be the case that a specific firm may 
have been located in that state since, say, 1964 but decided to engage in firearms production only in, say, 1993. 
Hence, the plant establishment year (in 1964) may well be different from the observation year (1993) in the 
ATF/AFMER record. What we explain is the number of plants in state x in period y; we do not observe the decision 
to move to state x in period y. The dynamic panel data GMM estimations (see Arellano and Bond, 1991) also are 
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and time fixed effects in all the regressions performed. We report in the main text the linear 
regression results which on the whole are as good as the Poisson results and the GMM estimates 
shown in the Appendices. It is reassuring that our results are rather consistent both within and 
across the chosen estimation procedures (for discussion, see Section IV). 
We report two tables of results each for the estimations: (1) for the ATF/Laws data (Tables 4 
and 5); (2) for the B/L data (Tables 6 and 7); and (3) for the V/H data (Tables 8 and 9). In each 
case, the first table introduces all the regulatory indices at the same time and the control variables 
progressively (private sector, public sector, and crime-related controls); the second table reverses 
this. Except for regression constants, all coefficients that are statistically significant (at the usual 
levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10) are presented in the tables in bold type-font. 
Table 4 reports on the matching of ATF/AFMER with ATF/Laws data for 1997-2010 and 
2000-2010 (given that some data for 1998 are missing) and for our control variables. Since the 
results are virtually unaltered by the missing observations for 1998, Table 5 uses the entire 1997 
to 2010 time period. The goodness of fit obtained for the estimations with both the ATF/Laws 
and the B/L data is similar at around 0.60 (Tables 4 to 7). A different goodness of fit is obtained 
for the V/H data (around 0.18). In the latter case (Tables 8 and 9), to cover the 1986 to 1999 time 
period, it was necessary to reduce the number of control variables as the data for some controls 
are available only as from 1990 and 1992 onward, respectively. 
Reading Tables 4 and 5 for our ATF/Law variables of interest, the ATF_statelicense variable 
is statistically significant and, as expected, negatively related to the number of plants producing 
firearms in a given state. With one weak exception, the other law variables are not statistically 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
performed as a robustness exercise: Since we use the stock of establishments as the independent variable, it could be 
the case that the lagged stock affects the current stock (see Appendix D). 
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significant. Similarly, the results for the B/L data (Tables 6 and 7) show that the only regulatory 
index variable that is consistently statistically significant is B/L_trafficking. Again, as expected, 
it is negatively related to the number of plants producing in a given state. The results for the V/H 
data (Tables 8 and 9), covering the 1986-1999 data span, show fairly consistent statistical 
significance only for V/H_checks, which is negatively related to the number of firearms plants 
producing a given state. 
As mentioned, all estimations include state and time fixed effects as well as a number of 
control variables. Regarding the controls, on the whole we obtain the expected results, and they 
are fairly stable across the estimations. Population seems to play a positive and statistically 
significant role with respect to the number of plants located in a given state. More populous 
states may be expected to host correspondingly more entrepreneurs and businesses, including 
those producing firearms. (Or perhaps more populous states, with a larger number of potential 
employees, have lower average wages.) Higher state tax revenues (more fiscal pressure) are 
associated in a negative and statistically significant way to the number of plants producing in a 
given state. An elevated level of crime, especially violent crime, seems to play a negative role 
with respect to plant numbers. Higher rates of unionization and higher industrial wages paid in a 
given state also seem to play an adverse role with respect to the number of firearms plants in a 
given state. 
TABLES 4 TO 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The key table in this paper, Table 10, summarizes all of our empirical findings. Bearing in mind 
that the law variables – ATF/Laws (1997-2010), B/L (2006-2010), and V/H (1986-1999) – are 
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not strictly comparable, the results should be read downward within each of the two-column sets 
and only with caution across them. Reading across, however, is attractive because of the 25-
year-long time-period then covered, 1986 to 2010. 
Table 10 is constructed as follows. The first column lists the three sets of law variables, plus 
the control variables. There then follow three sets of columns, one each for the results of the 
regressions with each set of law variables. The negative and plus signs indicate the sign of the 
estimated parameters, taken from Tables 4 to 9. A checkmark says that the sign goes into the 
expected direction Shaded cells indicate that the estimated parameter is statistically significant 
(at 0.10 or better). 
For the ATF/Laws columns, the law variables conform to our expectations. The state license 
requirement is associated with a smaller number of firearms premises hosted by a state. The 
requirement is not onerous but may indicate a stricter regulatory “climate” in the state. The other 
variables are for the most part not statistically significant but go in the direction we would expect 
except for the interstate commerce with contiguous states variable on which we had no 
expectation for the sign, only that it not be statistically significant (which it is not). The signs for 
the private sector, public sector, and crime variables are for the most part in the expected 
direction, and several are statistically significant. There are no statistically significant 
coefficients contrary to our expectations. 
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
For the B/L columns, recall that the law variables are composites, each constructed from 
several underlying variables (see Table 2 and Appendix Table A1). The B/L_trafficking variable 
is statistically significant and in the expected direction (negative) and is a summary measure 
intended to capture the existence of state-level firearms dealer regulation; the imposition of 
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limits to bulk firearms purchases; laws to assist crime gun identification; and a reporting 
requirement for lost or stolen firearms. Together they are aimed at curbing firearms trafficking. 
While no legitimate firearms manufacturer would object to this on a per se basis, at the 
perceptual level such efforts do indicate a less firearms-“friendly” state climate for the firearms 
industry. The remaining law and control variables are (almost) all in the expected direction, 
where we had expectations, and no statistically significant coefficient is contrary to expectations. 
Like their B/L analogues, the V/H index variables are composites (see Table 2 and 
Appendix Table A1). Here, the trafficking variable consists of state legislation to restrict firearms 
sales to one firearm per month; a state dealer license and inspection requirement; and the 
imposition of a minimum age for the purchase and sale of firearms. In our estimations, the signs 
point in the opposite direction to what we expected but the coefficients for the index are not 
statistically significant. The other law index variables all point in the expected direction (where 
we had an expectation), and one is statistically significant. For the control variables, the results 
also are as expected except for the population variable, the sign of which goes in the opposite 
direction of what we expected, but it is not statistically significant in any case. 
One finding that seems puzzling is that the trafficking variable for the B/L data shows the 
expected negative sign and is statistically significant, whereas for the V/H data it is positive, 
although not statistically significant. Similarly, although both carry the expected negative sign, 
the check variable for the B/L data (state universal background check requirement and state 
permit needed to purchase firearms) is not statistically significant while a similar check variable 
for the V/H data (state permit needed to purchase a firearm; firearms registration required; 
background checks for sales from dealers; background checks for private sales) is statistically 
significant. In other words, in one case trafficking is significant and check is not (B/L); in the 
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other case we have the opposite result (V/H). The difference in the years covered may explain 
this: federal-level background checks were introduced only as of November 1998. Thus, in the 
V/H data (1986-1999), state-level background checks were the only kind of checks conducted 
and might be expected to carry a significant negative coefficient on the parameter; in contrast, 
the B/L state-level data for 2006-2010 are additional to federal background checks and might not 
be expected to make much of an additional difference in terms of the number of established 
plants. And as regards the trafficking variables, the potential for firearms trafficking would seem 
to have mattered more in the 2000s (B/L) than it mattered in the late 1980s to 1990s (V/H). 
Taken as a whole, for the vast majority of our variables the results conform to the 
expectation that more “lax” firearms law is associated with larger numbers of firearms 
manufacturing plants in a given state and year, 1986 to 2010. The laws that our variables capture 
are not about production; instead, they are about the product (e.g., bans), its distribution (e.g., 
state license for dealers), its monitoring (e.g., firearms registration; purchase restrictions), and its 
end-use (e.g., child access prevention; sentencing laws). They would seem to capture a given 
state’s overall “attitude” and “business climate” toward firearms manufacturers and might be 
seen to influence a firearms manufacturer’s identity and, hence, preference to establish a 
manufacturing premise in one state or another. 
In a way, our findings then are reassuring. The firearms industry is “just another industry” in 
that it responds to economic incentives and disincentives, of which relevant state firearms laws 
are an example: State laws play but an incremental role in determining the number of firearms 
manufacturing plants in a state; they are one factor among many. If this is the correct 
interpretation of our findings, then both sides in the “gun control” debate – pro and con – should 
be pleased with the results: Both might argue “I told you so: Laws matter!” The more 
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dispassionate, scholarly point is that to the best of our knowledge we now have a first-time 
quantitative, empirical confirmation that state firearms laws matter in influencing the number of 
firearms manufacturing plants established in a state and that we have a hint about the direction in 
which further tightening or relaxation of relevant law might go. For instance, if there is a bit 
more “stickiness” to the supply-side of the market than is often presumed, states can impose 
higher bars on some aspects of firearms legislation without fear of a manufacturing exodus. To 
the extent that states confine their legislative forays to laws concerning firearms purchasing 
specifically rather than manufacturing licenses, for instance, they may not need to worry 
overmuch about scaring off these corporations.22 
Indeed, our annual, descriptive record of our ATF/AFMER data tells us that, once situated in 
one state, it is exceedingly rare for a firearms manufacturer to move its entire operation to 
another state. (And our statistical procedure is correspondingly careful in that it measures the 
number of plants, not the movement of manufacturing premises from one state to another.) The 
“lock, stock, and barrel” movement of a company like PTR-91, which moved in 2013 from 
Connecticut to South Carolina, is the exception. The norm is given by examples such as Kahr 
Arms, Remington Arms, Ruger, and Beretta USA: Manufacturing premises in some states 
“atrophy” over time as companies shift production gradually toward new establishments in new 
states. This process is slow, evolves over long periods of time, and is as wrapped up with the 
private and public sector-related control variables, especially the cost of doing business (e.g., 
taxation, unionization, wage rates, and competition for qualified workers given the existing 
                                                          
22 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this policy-relevant point. 
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manufacturing base in a state) as it is wrapped up with firearms law.23 In this regard, even the 
PTR-91 example fits the bill: News reports spoke as much of the economic incentives offered as 
they spoke of the firearms-“friendly” culture that ostensibly induced the company to move from 
Connecticut to South Carolina in 2013 (Ghosh, 2014). 
As prominently exemplified by the country’s automotive industry, it is common knowledge 
that the U.S. manufacturing base has slowly shifted out of the country’s Northeast region to the 
Midwest, South, and Southwest (from “rustbelt” to “sunbelt”). As the market share of U.S. 
automotive brands has declined, its spatial concentration, once focused on Detroit, Michigan, has 
declined as well. Conversely, non-U.S. brands have chosen to locate in the Midwest and the 
South.24 Something similar has happened, and continues to happen, with the firearms industry – 
albeit for somewhat different reasons. 
                                                          
23 For example, Remington Arms, a storied rifle brand with a nearly 200-year-long corporate history, has been 
located in Ilion, New York, since 1828. In the wake of repeated ownership changes, corporate headquarters moved 
several times, most recently in 1996 to Madison, North Carolina. Over the years the firm has closed various facilities 
in the North (e.g., in Connecticut) and generally expanded in the South (e.g., it opened a new firearm production 
plant in 1997 in Mayfield, Kentucky, and in February 2014 announced an expansion to take place at its Huntsville, 
Alabama, establishment). Thus, recent industry talk about Remington possibly closing its aging Ilion, NY, plant and 
consolidating its manufacturing operations to the South may reflect as much a general commercial discussion within 
the parent company as a political one having to do with firearms laws. Similarly, from 1995 to 1996 another 
prominent firearms maker, Sturm Ruger & Co. (Ruger, for short), while retaining revolver and rifle production at its 
Newport, New Hampshire, facility, moved the vast majority of its pistol production from Southport, Connecticut, to 
Prescott, Arizona. The remainder of its pistol production was moved to New Hampshire and, although corporate 
headquarters remain there, the Connecticut manufacturing operations were closed. On 8 May 2013, Ruger 
announced the building of a third manufacturing plant, for rifle production, to be located in Mayodan, North 
Carolina. Local news media reported that the company was offered several millions of dollars worth of incentives 
(http://www.journalnow.com/business/business_news/local/article_69d18da6-4705-11e3-b38c-019bb30f31a.html). 
And on 29 January 2014, Beretta USA (the U.S. subsidiary of an Italian brand) announced that it would open a new 
production facility in the state of Tennessee, near Nashville, rather than expand its operations at its current Maryland 
location, just south of Washington, D.C. The company stated that its primary selection criterion was related to 
firearms regulation: “We started our search by looking only at States that have a consistent history of support for and 
likelihood of future support for Second Amendment rights” (http://www.beretta.com/en-us/transcript-of-jeff-rehs-
speech-on-new-plant-in-tennessee/). Also see the 29 January 2014 Washington Times news account at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jan/29/beretta-announces-tennessee-plant-says-its-notlea/# 
ixzz2rzAntvLW). But since those laws are about the product, not the production, Beretta’s statement signals more 
about its sentiment and location preferences than it does about its cost of doing business. 
24 Thus, foreign nameplates opening plants as from the 1980s onward are located as follows: Toyota (in IN, KY, 
MS, TX); Honda (AL, IN, OH); Nissan (MS, TN); Fuji Heavy Industries (i.e., Subaru) (IN); Mitsubishi (IL); 
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Table 1. Number of plants per state and year in selected years (dependent variable). 
 1986 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
ALASKA 0 1 0 1 0 1 
ALABAMA 2 3 4 2 3 11 
ARKANSAS 3 5 5 3 7 20 
ARIZONA 11 12 14 13 24 62 
CALIFORNIA 22 24 16 19 14 27 
COLORADO 3 6 3 3 5 20 
CONNECTICUT 12 10 10 11 16 17 
DELAWARE 0 1 0 0 0 1 
FLORIDA 12 19 18 15 25 54 
GEORGIA 8 7 7 6 11 27 
HAWAII 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IOWA 0 0 0 1 1 8 
IDAHO 1 1 6 7 9 23 
ILLINOIS 4 8 7 7 10 20 
INDIANA 3 3 3 3 3 17 
KANSAS 1 1 3 3 1 14 
KENTUCKY 1 0 2 5 6 15 
LOUISIANA 4 2 2 2 2 2 
MASSACHUSETTS 4 5 9 6 9 9 
MARYLAND 3 3 3 6 7 12 
MAINE 2 3 2 3 4 7 
MICHIGAN 2 6 0 4 5 16 
MINNESOTA 3 3 6 8 14 23 
MISSOURI 1 3 6 11 16 40 
MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 1 0 4 
MONTANA 3 5 5 9 8 22 
NORTH CAROLINA 0 7 4 5 4 39 
NORTH DAKOTA 0 1 1 0 0 0 
NEBRASKA 1 2 2 3 3 11 
NEH HAMPSHIRE 1 2 4 5 6 13 
NEW JERSEY 1 1 0 0 2 2 
NEW MEXICO 3 3 0 1 1 7 
NEVADA 1 5 2 5 7 16 
NEW YORK 3 6 3 6 7 19 
OHIO 6 11 13 16 19 36 
OKLAHOMA 3 4 3 7 12 29 
OREGON 7 4 10 6 9 30 
PENNSYLVANIA 11 15 12 10 14 35 
RHODE ISLAND 0 0 0 0 0 1 
SOUTH CAROLINA 0 1 0 5 2 11 
SOUTH DAKOTA 1 2 3 8 6 13 
TENNESSE 2 9 8 6 8 23 
TEXAS 13 30 24 20 29 93 
UTAH 7 6 5 5 12 26 
VIRGINIA 0 4 3 1 7 33 
VERMONT 2 3 2 4 5 8 
WASHINGTON 4 8 9 9 12 20 
WISCONSIN 3 4 2 5 8 20 
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WEST VIRGINIA 1 1 1 3 2 9 
WYOMING 1 2 3 3 3 11 
TOTAL 176 262 245 282 378 977 




Table 2. State law-related variables. 
 
Variable name Rubric and description 
 
Panel A: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) 
ATF_waitperiod_1 
ATF_waitperiod_2 
Purchasing waiting period: Refers to the period between application for 
firearms purchase and allowable receipt or delivery. 
ATF_statelicense License: Indicates the existence of state regulation requiring state licenses for 
firearms dealers or manufacturers. 
ATF_preemption Preemption: Indicates that state jurisdiction overrides subordinate 
jurisdictions in whole or in part. 
ATF_interstate Limits to interstate purchase and sale: Also known as "Contiguous State 
Provisions," they indicate legislative limits to interstate purchase and sale 
enacted by jurisdictions based on the (federal) Gun Control Act. 
 
Panel B: Brady Center/Law Center data (B/L) 
B/L_trafficking Curb firearm trafficking: Includes the existence of firearm dealer regulation; 
limits to bulk purchases; crime gun identification; and reporting of lost or 
stolen guns. 
B/L_checks Strengthen Brady background checks: Includes universal background check; 
permit needed to purchase. 
B/L_childsafe Child safety provisions: Includes child safety locks; child access prevention. 
B/L_publicplace Guns in public places & local control: Includes no guns allowed in 
workplace; no guns on college campuses; not a concealed carrying of 
weapons (CCW) permit “shall issue” state; no state preemption. 
 
Panel C: Vernick/Hepburn data (V/H) 
V/H_trafficking* 
 
Sales and purchase restrictions: Includes one-gun-per-month law; state dealer 
license and inspection; minimum purchase and sale age. 
V/H_checks* 
 
Sales and purchase restrictions: Includes permit to purchase; firearm 
registration required; background checks for sales from dealers; background 
checks for private sales. 
V/H_childsafe 
 
Possession, carrying, and storage laws: Includes child access prevention. 
V/H_bans 
 
State laws banning certain firearms: Includes “Saturday Night Special” ban; 
assault weapon ban. 
V/H_sentencing 
 
Sentence enhancement laws for possession or use of firearm: Includes 
mandatory minimum sentence; minimum add-on sentence. 
 
Notes: See Appendix Table A1 for details regarding coding and code values. The variable words associated with 
each data source (_waiting_1, _waiting_2, …, _bans, _sentencing) are shorthand expressions to indicate the 
predominant intent of the law variables captured in each index. Panel B: In the original B/L data there is a fifth 
rubric, Ban Military-Style Assault Weapons that did not show sufficient variability across states and years and was 
dropped from our estimations. Panel C: * The ordering of the five V/H rubrics has been altered to obtain indices 
comparable to those obtained from B/L. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable name Period Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
num_plants (dependent var.) 1986-2010 1,250** 7.17 8.64 0 93 
ATF_waitperiod_1 1997-2010* 686 0.25 0.43 0 1 
ATF_waitperiodt_2 1997-2010* 684 42.64 117.72 0 720 
ATF_statelicense 1997-2010* 692 1.07 2.09 0 11 
ATF_preemption 1997-2010* 688 0.80 0.40 0 1 
ATF_interstate 1997-2010* 650 0.65 0.48 0 1 
B/L_trafficking 2006-2010 250 4.42 5.43 0 22 
B/L_checks 2006-2010 250 3.02 6.07 0 23 
B/L_childsafe 2006-2010 250 1.78 2.52 0 9 
B/L_publicplace 2006-2010 250 4.32 1.97 0 8 
V/H_trafficking 1986-1999 700 1.95 2.77 0 10 
V/H_checks 1986-1999 700 1.36 1.97 0 8 
V/H_childsafe 1986-1999 700 0.64 1.47 0 4 
V/H_bans 1986-1999 700 0.30 0.82 0 4 
V/H_sentencing 1986-1999 700 1.29 0.58 0 2 
log_population 1986-2010 1,250 15.03 1.01 13.02 17.43 
log_num_firms 1990-2010 1,049 8.43 1.06 6.14 11.00 
union_member 1986-2010 1,250 0.17 0.18 0.009 1 
wage_quotient 1990-2010 1,049 1 0.39 0.16 2.10 
taxes_pc 1992-2010 950 1.93 0.73 0.72 12.70 
violent_crimes_pc 1986-2010 1,250 0.005 0.002 0.00 0.01 
property_crimes_pc 1986-2010 1,250 0.039 0.011 0.02 0.08 
political_balance 1986-2010 1,199 -0.313 1.703 -2 2 




Table 4. ATF/Laws. Panel data estimations with state and time fixed effects (I). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1997-2010 2000-2010 
REGULATORY VARIABLES      
- ATF_waitperiod_1 -0.549 -1.179 -0.354 -0.216 -1.069 -0.162 
 (1.581) (1.774) (1.886) (1.596) (1.819) (1.971) 
- ATF_statelicense -0.864** -0.899** -0.962** -0.850** -0.830** -0.895** 
 (0.357) (0.374) (0.365) (0.356) (0.369) (0.359) 
- ATF_preemption 3.283 4.508 4.919* 3.095 3.845 4.252 
 (3.421) (3.118) (2.880) (2.923) (2.939) (2.781) 
- ATF_interstate 0.544 -0.182 -0.515 0.984 0.297 0.010 
 (0.881) (0.871) (0.904) (1.098) (1.144) (1.116) 
ECONOMIC CONTROLS      
- log_num_firms -11.416 -3.334 -1.762 -19.051 -10.185 -7.473 
 (10.132) (10.586) (10.731) (12.985) (12.603) (12.651) 
- wage_quotient -3.092 -4.162 -4.268 -3.860 -4.937 -5.455 
 (7.340) (7.601) (7.770) (7.886) (8.085) (8.352) 
- union_member -0.156 -0.054 -0.070 0.293 0.385 0.293 
 (1.208) (1.271) (1.157) (0.863) (0.842) (0.754) 
- log_population 81.347** 70.142** 62.131* 118.945*** 102.540** 92.456** 
 (34.450) (33.012) (31.108) (42.221) (40.358) (38.998) 
CRIME CONTROLS      
- log_violent_crimes_pc  -8.275*** -7.412**  -9.341** -7.834** 
  (3.013) (3.081)  (3.843) (3.834) 
-log_property_crimes_pc  -4.667 -7.556  -7.192 -10.513 
  (6.433) (6.254)  (7.395) (7.347) 
PUBLIC SECTOR CONTROLS     
- taxes_pc   -1.895***   -1.879*** 
   (0.460)   (0.469) 
- political_balance   0.654   0.528 
   (0.445)   (0.430) 
Observations 606 606 592 538 538 526 
R-squared 0.587 0.605 0.623 0.605 0.624 0.640 
Number of states 49 49 48 49 49 48 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include state and time 
fixed effects. Constant not reported here. Using ATF_waitperiod_2 does not change the reported results. There are 
49 states because Hawaii, with no reported firearms manufacturer plants for the whole period (see Table 1), was 






Table 5. ATF/Laws. Panel data estimations with state and time fixed effects, 1997-2010 (II). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
REGULATORY VARIABLES     
- ATF_waitperiod_1 -0.309    
 (1.777)    
- ATF_statelicense  -0.807**   
  (0.317)   
- ATF_ preemption   3.194  
   (2.265)  
- ATF_interstate    -0.296 
    (0.802) 
ECONOMIC CONTROLS     
- log_num_firms 3.718 -2.107 4.944 2.378 
 (10.596) (9.266) (10.255) (10.869) 
- wage_quotient -3.024 -2.503 -2.470 -3.780 
 (6.830) (6.154) (6.583) (8.133) 
- union_member 0.529 0.117 0.504 0.230 
 (1.014) (0.871) (1.003) (1.318) 
- log_population 44.930* 50.968* 45.399* 54.569* 
 (26.154) (25.506) (26.653) (28.946) 
CRIME CONTROLS     
- log_violent_crimes_pc -4.845* -5.245* -5.165* -6.083** 
 (2.611) (2.621) (2.644) (2.962) 
- log_property_crimes_pc -5.644 -5.431 -6.642 -6.812 
 (5.762) (5.494) (5.507) (6.067) 
PUBLIC SECTOR CONTROLS     
- taxes_pc -1.996*** -2.037*** -2.044*** -2.007*** 
 (0.540) (0.532) (0.557) (0.559) 
- political_balance 0.534 0.729* 0.653 0.575 
 (0.380) (0.385) (0.392) (0.404) 
Observations 658 662 658 622 
R-squared 0.590 0.611 0.596 0.606 
Number of states 48 48 48 48 





Table 6. B/L Data. Panel data estimations with state and time fixed effects, 2006-2010 (I). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
REGULATORY VARIABLES     
- B/L_trafficking -0.982*** -0.848** -0.980** -1.004** 
 (0.357) (0.370) (0.367) (0.377) 
- B/L_checks -0.569 -0.805 -1.020 -0.989 
 (1.916) (1.598) (1.783) (1.821) 
- B/L_childsafe 0.536 0.801* 0.583 0.575 
 (0.478) (0.444) (0.400) (0.386) 
- B/L_publicplace -0.415 0.093 -0.036 -0.088 
 (0.578) (0.527) (0.523) (0.523) 
ECONOMIC CONTROLS     
- log_num_firms  -22.198 -18.977 -18.508 
  (22.225) (21.389) (21.709) 
- wage_quotient  -23.208 -26.266 -27.208* 
  (18.079) (15.782) (16.058) 
- union_member  -2.012 -1.528 -1.122 
  (2.136) (1.943) (2.040) 
- log_population  180.929** 158.363** 156.223* 
  (72.523) (75.980) (81.692) 
CRIME CONTROLS     
- log_violent_crimes_pc   -12.226*** -11.722** 
   (4.126) (4.408) 
- log_property_crimes_pc   0.967 -0.506 
   (9.592) (10.877) 
PUBLIC SECTOR CONTROLS     
- taxes_pc    -0.507 
    (0.363) 
- political_balance    -0.046 
    (0.371) 
Observations 245 245 245 239 
R-squared 0.486 0.559 0.587 0.587 
Number of states 49 49 49 48 





Table 7. B/L Data. Panel data estimations with state and time fixed effects, 2006-2010 (II). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
REGULATORY VARIABLES     
- B/L_trafficking -0.824**    
 (0.332)    
- B/L_checks  -0.425   
  (1.261)   
- B/L_childsafe   0.250  
   (0.382)  
- B/L_publicplace    -0.146 
    (0.535) 
ECONOMIC CONTROLS     
- log_num_firms -11.926 -10.393 -13.649 -10.811 
 (21.675) (22.197) (22.411) (22.213) 
- wage_quotient -27.581* -28.563* -28.982* -29.142* 
 (15.566) (15.564) (15.481) (15.600) 
- union_member -1.180 -1.401 -1.468 -1.175 
 (1.946) (1.991) (1.999) (2.110) 
- log_population 147.149* 153.995* 160.763* 152.444* 
 (86.264) (87.068) (84.626) (84.664) 
CRIME CONTROLS     
- log_violent_crimes_pc -12.108*** -11.310** -10.766** -11.288** 
 (4.313) (4.223) (4.234) (4.343) 
- log_property_crimes_pc -1.763 -1.972 -1.396 -1.860 
 (11.045) (11.088) (10.875) (11.097) 
PUBLIC SECTOR CONTROLS     
- taxes_pc -0.542 -0.495 -0.470 -0.499 
 (0.373) (0.382) (0.382) (0.374) 
- political_balance 0.022 -0.047 -0.083 -0.036 
 (0.424) (0.432) (0.402) (0.428) 
Observations 239 239 239 239 
R-squared 0.582 0.574 0.575 0.574 
Number of states 48 48 48 48 


















     
- V/H_trafficking 0.158 0.159 0.154 0.153 0.231** 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.111) (0.113) 
- V/H_checks -0.459* -0.453* -0.444* -0.468 -0.591** 
 (0.261) (0.257) (0.264) (0.301) (0.234) 
- V/H_childsafe 0.013 0.018 0.013 0.023 -0.448** 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.142) (0.141) (0.208) 
- V/H_bans -0.292 -0.285 -0.315 -0.319 -0.129 
 (0.247) (0.237) (0.242) (0.250) (0.287) 
- V/H_sentencing -0.327 -0.285 -0.434 -0.438 1.163 
 (1.050) (1.012) (0.966) (0.969) (1.128) 
ECONOMIC CONTROLS      
- log_num_firms     -2.865 
     (3.468) 
- union_member  -0.533 -0.511 -0.516 -0.288 
  (0.318) (0.319) (0.315) (0.392) 
- log_population  -0.546 -0.691 -0.628 -2.938 
  (2.865) (2.792) (2.801) (5.526) 
CRIME CONTROLS      
- log_violent_crimes_pc   -0.866 -0.943 0.200 
   (0.862) (0.871) (1.135) 
- log_property_crimes_pc   -0.387 -0.388 -2.595 
   (1.782) (1.797) (2.899) 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
CONTROLS 
     
- taxes_pc     0.072 
     (0.468) 
- political_balance    -0.048 -0.196 
    (0.100) (0.138) 
Observations 686 686 686 672 384 
R-squared 0.195 0.197 0.201 0.199 0.157 
Number of states 49 49 49 48 48 






Table 9. V/H Data. Panel data estimations with state and time fixed effects, 1986-1999 (II). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
REGULATORY VARIABLES 
- V/H_trafficking 0.157     
 (0.114)     
- V/H_checks  -0.529*    
  (0.298)    
- V/H_childsafe   -0.120   
   (0.151)   
- V/H_bans    -0.451  
    (0.281)  
- V/H_sentencing     -1.030 
     (0.755) 
ECONOMIC CONTROLS 
- union_member -0.706* -0.639 -0.703 -0.670 -0.609 
 (0.388) (0.392) (0.440) (0.447) (0.363) 
- log_population -0.880 0.261 -0.114 -0.824 -0.950 
 (2.707) (2.869) (2.670) (2.694) (2.700) 
CRIME CONTROLS 
- log_violent_crimes_pc -0.708 -0.745 -0.604 -0.810 -0.936 
 (0.820) (0.837) (0.860) (0.833) (0.829) 
- log_property_crimes_pc 0.005 -0.272 -0.290 -0.064 -0.195 
 (1.692) (1.698) (1.825) (1.705) (1.685) 
PUBLIC SECTOR CONTROLS      
- political_balance -0.048 -0.053 -0.060 -0.078 -0.079 
 (0.105) (0.100) (0.099) (0.103) (0.102) 
Observations 672 672 672 672 672 
R-squared 0.177 0.189 0.175 0.177 0.179 
Number of states 48 48 48 48 48 




Table 10. Summary of results. 
  ATF/Laws (1997-2010) B/L (2006-2010) V/H (1986-1999) 
  Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 Table 9 













ATF_waitperiod_1 −  −          
ATF_statelicense −  −          
ATF_preempt +  +          
ATF_interstate [−] [−]          
B/L_trafficking     −  −      
B/L_checks   −  −      
B/L_childsafe     [+] [+]     
B/L_publicplace     −  −      
V/H_trafficking         +  +  
V/H_checks         − * −  
V/H_childsafe         [+] [−] 
V/H_bans         −  −  
V/H_sentencing         −  −  
log_num_firms −  +  − − n/a n/a 
wage_quotient −  −  −  −  n/a n/a 
union_member −  + −  −  −  −  
log_population +  +  +  +  − − 
log_violent_crimes_pc −  −  −  −  −  −  
log_property_crimes_pc −  −  −  −  −  −  
taxes_pc −  −  −  −  n/a n/a 
political_balance [+] [+] [−] [−] [−] [−] 
Notes: Summary of results from the linear estimates (Tables 4 to 9). +/− indicates the sign of the estimated coeffient. 
A checkmark indicates a coefficient in the expected direction. A cell without checkmark indicates that the sign went 
in the unexpected direction. […] indicates that we had no expectation on the direction of the sign (nor expected 
statistical significance). The sign inside [...] is the observed sign from the estimations. “n/a” indicates not used as 
data was not available. Shaded cells indicate statistically significant estimates. * The V/H_checks coefficient is not 
statistically significant in col. 4 of Table 9 but it is statistically significant in cols. 1, 2, 3, and 5 of that table, 
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